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1 Introduction
A Gricean view of cognitive agents holds that
agents are fully rational and adhere to the max-
ims of conversation that entail that speakers adopt
shared intentions and fully aligned preferences–
e.g. (Allen and Litman, 1987; Lochbaum, 1998).
These assumptions are unwarranted in many con-
versational settings. In this paper we propose a
different view and an annotation scheme for it.
We propose a game theoretic approach to con-
versation. While we assume like Grice that con-
versational agents are rational, agents talk to max-
imize their expected utility (a measure that com-
bines belief and preference). Preferences together
with beliefs guide conversational actions as much
as they guide non linguistic actions. Conversa-
tions are dynamic and extensive games, and they
have an in principle unbounded number of pos-
sible moves and no mandatory stopping points—
you can, in some sense, always say anything, and
you can always continue a conversation. The
moves for each player consist in making a dis-
course contribution, which we finitely charac-
terize using discourse structure in the sense of
(Asher and Lascarides, 2003). Such discourse
structures consist of discourse units linked to each
via discourse relations like Elaboration, Question-
Answer-Pair (QAP) and Explanation. In addition
these discourse relations serve to link one partici-
pant’s contribution to another; for instance, if one
agent asks a question, another may respond with
an answer, the two contributions then linked to-
gether by the relation QAP. Conversational partic-
ipants are alternatively senders (S) or receivers of
messages (R). S sends a signal s bearing in mind
that receiver R has to figure out: (a) what is the
message m(s)? What is S publicly committed
to? (b) Is m(s) credible or not? (c) Given a status
for m(s), what signal s′ should R send in return?
R now becomes sender and S, now the receiver,
goes through the calculation steps (a)-(c). We as-
sume that at least part of the conventional mean-
ing of the signal is determined prior to game play.
In calculation (a), R must calculate using a form
of generalized signaling game what are the pub-
lic commitments that S has made—these include
not only the fixed semantics but also the impli-
catures that introduce discourse relations between
contributions. Sometimes these involve strategic
considerations: for instance, is S actually reply-
ing to the question asked in the prior turn or is she
engaged in some other discourse move? If she is
answering the question, is this something that S
cannot plausibly later deny? (Asher and Quinley,
2011) argue that a trust game format is the right
one for computing optimal moves in task (c).
(Traum and Allen, 1994) advocates a related
view on which cooperativity is determined only
by the social conventions guiding conversation,
obligations that do not presuppose speakers adopt
each other’s goals (Traum et al., 2008). For us,
the social conventions that are foundational on
Traum’s account are however themselves based
on utility. Utility is also the basis for train-
ing agents to behave in a certain way through
reinforcement learning for conversational agents
(Frampton and Lemon, 2009).
2 Example negotiation dialogue
We provide a sample annotation of a negotiation
dialogue (table (1) from our corpus, which con-
sists of recorded chat negotiations taking place
during on-line games of The Settlers of Catan,1
a popular boardgame. The annotations are done
1See the original game on www.catan.com, adapted
by us on homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/mguhe/socl/
Speaker Id Turn Dom. function Rhet. function Prefs
Euan 47 [And I alt tab back from the tutorial.] 1 OTHER
[What’s up?] 2 OTHER Result*(47 1,47 2)
Joel 48 [do you want to trade?] OFFER Q-elab(47 2, 48)
〈Joel,?,?,Euan〉
Card. 49 [joel fancies a bit of your clay] STRAT.-COMMENT Expl*(48, 49) Pref(joel)
Joel 50 [yes] OTHER Ackn(49, 50)
Joel 51 [!] OTHER Comment(50, 51)
Euan 52 [Whatcha got?] COUNTEROFFER Q-elab([48-50], 52)
〈Euan,?,?,Joel〉
Joel 53 [wheat] HAS-RESOURCES QAP(52, 53)
〈Joel,wheat〉
Euan 54 [I can wheat for clay.] COUNTEROFFER Elab([52,53], 54)
〈Euan,wheat,clay,Joel〉
Joel 55 [awesome] ACCEPT(54) Ackn(54, 55)
Table 1: Example annotation, with offer arguments: offerer, requested resource, offered resource, receiver.
using the GLOZZ tool developed by the Univer-
sity of Caen.2
Our annotation model features both a discourse
structure level (DS) and a dialogue act (DA) level,
which categorizes elementary discourse units or
EDUs, given by a pre-annotation, relative to their
role in negotiations. DS encodes communicative
functions of EDUs or clusters of EDUs using the
relations of (Asher and Lascarides, 2003), simi-
lar to but more detailed than DAMSL’s (Core and
Allen, 1997). Unlike (Sidner, 1994), which also
provides domain level acts for negotiations, our
semantics for DAs does not assume Gricean coop-
erativity. Our DAs are: OFFER, COUNTEROFFER,
STRATEGIC COMMENT a comment about a play
in the game, OTHER. Each act also comes with
an annotation of resources that are offered, re-
quested, or simply possessed. With respect to the
discourse relations, Expl* and Result* stand for
“metalinguistic” relations: Result*(47 1, 47 2)
means that the action described in 47 1 causes the
speech act of asking the question in 47 2. Sim-
ilarly, Expl*(48,49) indicates that Cardlinger ex-
plains why Joel asked the question in EDU 48.
Q-elab is the relation of follow up question or Q-
elab, and Ackn stands for the acknowledgment re-
lation, while QAP stands for Question-Answer-
Pair. The semantics for all these relations can be
found in (Asher and Lascarides, 2003).
Our annotators received training over 22 nego-
tiation dialogues with 560 turns. The inter annota-
tion agreement at both EDU and rhetorical struc-
ture levels for this training will be used to refine
the guidelines. In over 91 instances of doubly-
annotated EDUs considered, we have a kappa of
0.54, a moderate level due to the very high num-
2www.glozz.org
ber of “other” acts . For rhetorical structure, using
an exact match criterion of success (easy to com-
pute but harsher than necessary), we have a Kappa
of 0.45. These figures are very preliminary.
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